An informed evaluation of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967: A social science case study

Culled from Nigerian Muse

How do the Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler opportunity and grievance model, and the James Fearon and David Laitin’s civil war hypothesisassess the Nigeria Civil war (Biafra war of secession, 1967 – 1970)? Was the declaration of Biafra’s Independence largely as a result of opportunity or grievance?

Konye Obaji Ori

International Conflicts and Conflict Resolution

Department of International Relations

University of Indianapolis
12/02/09


Like several African nations, Nigeria was carved by the British who neglected the religious, ethnic and lingual differences that existed among the people who are Nigerians today. The country’s boundaries had been defined subjectively to demarcate where the contending claims of the colonial powers collided. Just seven years after independence from Britain in 1960, the eastern region of Nigeria by May 1967 declared itself an independent state called the Republic of Biafra, under the leadership of Lt Colonel Ojukwu in accordance with the wishes of the Igbo people. Upon this declaration, the Nigerian Civil War began; a war between the then eastern region of Nigeria and the rest of Nigeria. All efforts to intervene by eminent Nigerians and well - wishers were futile. The war began in 1967 and ended in 1970, costing over one million military and civilian casualties.

With advanced studies on civil wars today, the question asked here is what were the most relevant factors in the sudden occurrence of this civil war? I answer this question by assessing the Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s opportunity and grievance model, and the assessment of James Fearon and David Laitin’s civil war hypothesis in the case of the Nigerian civil war.

Previous researches have not overtly shown whether opportunity factors were more relevant than grievance factors, or vice versa, in the case of the Nigerian civil war. This study through a structured-focused analysis of events that led up to the war, and events during the war, argues that grievances such as ethnic rivalry and ethnic dominance, polarization and regionalism, perceived tribalism and religionism, and perceived income inequality, were the most significant factors that fuelled the Nigerian civil war. Opportunity factors such as weak democracy and state capacity, availability of oil, international recognition and sympathy, finance and the availability of arms were significant in assessing the outcome of the war than there were in assessing the outbreak of the war. This was because the opportunity factors favored the Nigerian side more so than the Biafran side. In conclusion, Biafra’s declaration of independence from Nigeria in 1967 is mostly based on grievance factors.

Literature

Are conflicts caused by ethnic tensions, religious differences, or other social affiliations, or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them?

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), opportunities are more important in explaining conflicts than are motives. A particularly powerful risk factor is dependence upon primary commodity exports. A likely explanation is the scope these activities provide for extortion of natural resources by rebel groups, donations from Diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments.

Hirshleifer (1995, 2001) provides an important refinement on the motive-opportunity dichotomy. He classifies the possible causes of conflict into preferences, opportunities and perceptions. The introduction of perceptions allows for the possibility that both opportunities and grievances might be wrongly perceived. If the perceived opportunity for rebellion is illusory – analogous to the `winners’ curse’ – unprofitability will cause collapse, perhaps before reaching our threshold for civil war. By contrast, when exaggerated grievances trigger rebellion, fighting does not dispel the misperception and indeed may generate genuine grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Four general explanations are often advanced to account for group rebellion: state responses and capabilities, diffusion, relative deprivation, and rational actor. One of the most commonly used indicators of relative deprivation is income inequality. The empirical evidence for an inequality effect on internal political conflict is, however, mixed. Studies by Sigelman and Simpson (1977), Muller (1985), Muller and Seligson (1987), Boswell and Dixon (1990), and Schock (1996) report a significant, positive relationship between income inequality and political violence. Hardy (1979) and Weede (1981, 1987), on the other hand, conclude that once a control for the level of economic development is introduced, the relationship between income inequality and political violence vanishes (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization. Opportunity may be determined by access to finance, such as the scope for extortion of natural resources, donations from a Diaspora population, and donations from hostile governments. Opportunity may also depend upon factors such as military advantage, cost of rebellion, geography: mountains and forests that may be needed to incubate rebellion. Both opportunities and grievances increase with population, a result compatible with both the opportunity and grievance accounts. However, grievances increase with population due to rising heterogeneity. Yet those aspects of heterogeneity that measurable are not associated with an increased risk of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Collier and Hoeffler (2004), researching the factors impacting on civil war onset, have found it useful to distinguish between greed- and grievance related factors. Generally, they find more empirical support for greed-related factors, meaning that greedy rebels start civil wars with a view to realizing political or economic gains when the political structure provides them with an opportunity to do so. The importance of political opportunities was especially highlighted by Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study on civil war onset, which concentrates on economic, political, and military aspects of state weakness (Gurses, Rost and McLeod 2008).

Under normal circumstances the amalgamation of Nigeria ought to have brought the various peoples together and provided a firm basis for the arduous task of establishing closer cultural, social, religious, and linguistic ties, vital for true unity among the people. There was division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced disparity in development. The Nigerian Civil War was the culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation from independence in 1960. This situation had its genesis in the geography, history, culture and demography of Nigeria. The immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as the coup and the counter coup of 1966 which altered the political equation and destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups (Atofarati, 1992).

James Fearon and David Laitin’s Civil War Hypothesis

According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the political and military technology of insurgency will be favored, and thus civil war made more likely:

When potential rebels face or have a newly independent state available, which suddenly loses the coercive backing of the former imperial power and whose military capabilities are new and untested.

When there is political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization and weakness, there is an opportunity for a separatist or center seeking rebellion.

When a regime mixes democratic with autocratic features; as this is likely to indicate political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state incapacity.

When a country’s population is large; it becomes necessary for the center to multiply layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local level and, also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a given level of income.

When the territorial base separated from the state's center by water or distance- for example, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan or Angola from Portugal; foreign governments or Diasporas willing to supply weapons, money, or training.

Land that supports the production of high value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, diamonds, and other contraband, can be used to finance an insurgency.

When the state’s revenues are derived primarily from oil exports.


The next section of this paper will evaluate these postulations and other hypotheses through a layered narration of the events leading to the Nigerian civil war.

The Creation of Nigeria and Ethno-political Split

Nigeria was composed of semi-autonomous Muslim feudal states in the desert north, and Christian and animist kingdoms in the south and east. During the colonial period, the British divided the country into three regions: The north which was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, the west which was dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group, and the east which was dominated by the Igbo ethnic group. The north had slightly more population than the other two regions combined, and on this basis the northern region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities (McCaskie, 1997). The dominant ethnic groups within these three regions sought economic, political, and social dominance in the new Nigeria.

Ethnic Rivalry and Ethnic Dominance (Grievance***)

Measures of a country's ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

According to Collier and Hoeffler’s grievance model, increased ethnic dominance increases the chances of civil conflict significantly. Prior to 1960, the region that became Nigeria had a population of 60 million people consisting of nearly 300 different ethnic and cultural groups. Of these numerous ethnicities, leaders of the Igbo and Yoruba ethnicities were at the forefront of the fight for independence from Britain. The Igbo’s and Yoruba’s wanted an independent Nigeria to be organized into several small states so that the conservative Northern ethnicities could not dominate the country. Northern leaders, however, fearful that independence would mean political and economic domination by the more educated elites in the South, preferred the perpetuation of British rule (Udofia, 1981).

The growth of nationalism in the society and the subsequent emergence of political parties were based on ethnicity and tribes rather than national interests, and therefore the country had no unifying effect on the people (Atofarati 1992).

Ethnic and religious hatreds are widely perceived as a cause of civil conflict. Although such hatreds cannot be quantified, they can evidently only occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi-religious. Intergroup hatreds must be greater in societies that are fractionalized than in those which are homogenous (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

As a condition for accepting independence, the Northerners demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the north having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, anxious to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands. A coalition of ethnic-based conservative parties emerged. In 1960, a population of 60 million people from nearly 300 different ethnic and cultural groups, with desires of their own sovereign nations was incorporated into a nation (Udofia, 1981).

Polarization and Regionalism (Grievance ***)

Policies that discriminate in favor of a particular language or religion should raise the risk of civil war onset in states with religious or linguistic minorities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The Macpherson's constitution of 1951, created this situation in Nigeria.

After World War II, there was political awareness and upsurge of nationalism in Africa. Political parties were formed on regional and ethnic basis. The outcome of the three political regions created in Nigeria was full scale regionalism. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ethnic polarization, increases the chances of war. The Macpherson's constitution of 1951, established a central legislative council and a central executive council for the country, and a greater measure of autonomy was granted the regions with stronger regional legislatures. All the political leaders who had strong and firm political bases in their regions fought hard for maximum powers for their regions which weakened the center (Atofarati, 1992). There was diffusion instead of fusion of the three units.

The only point on which Nigerian political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British of political independence - and even then they did not agree on the timing. With granting of independence in 1960, all the dirt, swept under the carpet, surfaced. Nigeria was now beset by strings of political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided nature of the political divisions of the country and the type of the existing federal constitution and the spirit in which it operated (Olusegun, 1980).

As hypothesized by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at greater risk for civil war.

Availability of Oil (Opportunity ***)

Primary commodity exports substantially increase conflict risk. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have interpreted this as being due to the opportunities such commodities provide for extortion, making rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive. Auty and Gelb (2001) likewise concludes that ’point resources’ such as minerals, have a particularly strong association with destabilizing social tension, while Murshed (2004) suggests that ‘point resources’ retard democratic and institutional development. Similarly, de Soysa (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that a dummy variable for oil exporters makes civil conflict more likely. Lujala (2005) concludes that onshore oil production increases the probability of civil conflict, but that offshore production does not, and Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) suggest that secondary diamonds increase the likelihood of conflict (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2005, 2).

In the case of Nigeria, the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Niger River delta had tempted the Igbo dominated South-Eastern region to annex in order to become economically self-sufficient. Prior to the discovery of oil, Nigeria's wealth derived from agricultural products from the south, and minerals from the north. In general, it seems fair to say that the results from the abundant empirical literature indicate that oil, gemstones, minerals and other ‘loot-able’ resources are connected with civil conflict, but that there appears to be no similar effect of less loot-able (and less valuable) resources such as agricultural land (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2005).

Northern Nigeria, up until around 1965, had had low-level demands to secede from Nigeria and retain its agricultural wealth for Northerners. These demands seemed to cease when it became clear that oil in the southeast would become a major revenue source. This further fuelled Igbo fears that the northerners had plans to strip eastern oil to benefit the North, following the exclusion of easterners from power. With oil now flowing in the Eastern Region, the way was now open for the implementation of the secession (Madiebo, 1980). Civil war chances are high when the state’s revenues are derived primarily from oil exports.

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2000), “the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict.” Primary commodities are however associated with other characteristics that may cause civil war, such as poor public service provision, corruption and economic mismanagement (Sachs and Warner, 2000). Potentially, any increase in conflict risk may be due to rebel responses to such poor governance rather than to financial opportunities.

Like it was in Nigeria, natural resources are usually found in only one part of the country, often in a peripheral area. According to Collier (2004), the people who live in this area are ready prey for secessionist political movements. To the usual romantic propaganda of identity politics, secessionist leaders can add the powerful language of economic self-interest: ‘our’ resources are being squandered by corrupt and alien elite. Large natural resource rents not only make civil war more likely, they make it more likely that a civil war will be secessionist. Like Katanga, Cabinda: Africa’s secessionist wars including that of Biafra have usually been related to natural resources.

Economic Growth (Opportunity*)/ Income Distribution (Grievance**)

Opportunities arise from atypically low income. Recruits must be paid, and their cost may be related to the income forgone by enlisting as a rebel. Rebellions may occur when foregone income is unusually low. The Igbos at the time may have had a percived economic marginalization and weer suceptible to fight for better economic opportunities in an independent Biafra. The three proxies for foregone income are mean income per capita, male secondary schooling, and the growth rate of the economy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Greater income inequality should be associated with higher risks of civil war onset

(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Income per capita in 1967 Nigeria was very low. Nigeria’s GDP as at 1967 was $5,203,136,000.00 (CIA: World Fact Book). During the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria's degree of income concentration was average for sub-Saharan Africa, which, after Latin America, had the highest income inequality of any region in the world. Because the rural masses in Nigeria were politically weak, official income distribution policies focused on interurban redistribution (Nigeria: Country Data). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), a higher per capita income should be associated with a lower risk of civil war onset because it is a proxy for a state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities.

The education proxy may affect the risk of conflict through changing attitudes. By 1957, Western Nigeria introduced Universal and Compulsory free primary education and devoted almost fifty per cent of the region's budget to education generally. At the attainment of the country independence in October 1960, there was already a wide gap between the North and the South in the matter of western education. The Northern region had only a handful University graduates and probably no more than two thousand (2000) holders of school certificate. The South, which received western education earlier than the North and which also, sponsored more students abroad than the north had these two categories of educated elements in their hundreds and thousands respectively.

Ten years later in 1967, there were about two and half million children in the primary schools of Eastern and Western regions, compared with a half million out of the greater population of the former North. Besides these, 119,000 students were in Southern secondary schools, against 14,000 in the Northern secondary schools (Atofarati, 1992). However the Western region at the break of the war was part of Nigeria, so their secondary schooling proxy factored into the Nigerian side, rather than the Biafran side.

The growth rate of the economy in the preceding period is intended to proxy new income opportunities: The lower the rate of growth, the higher the probability of unconstitutional political change (Alesina et al. 1996). However, the big brute fact according to Collier (2004) is that civil war is heavily concentrated in countries with low income, in economic decline, and dependent upon natural resources. Income inequality is also a strong grievance that increases the chances of rebellion. The relation between regional inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one as the poor may rebel to induce redistribution, and rich regions may mount secessionist rebellions to preempt redistribution (Sen, 1973), which was perceivably the case of Biafra.

Weak Democracy and State Capacity (Opportunity ***)

Researchers have often argued that state weakness plays a major role in causing and prolonging violent conflicts. To understand the role of state weakness in the Nigerian civil war, it is helpful to apply Bruce Bagley's theoretical conception of state capacity, which assesses the ability of government institutions to penetrate society, extract resources from it and regulate conflicts within it . . . [and] the ability of state authorities to govern legitimately, to enforce the law systematically, and to administer justice effectively throughout the national territory (Bagley 2001, 2)

In 1963, Nigeria declared itself a Federal Republic. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Christian-dominated Igbo ethnicity was appointed as its first president and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the Hausa and Muslim-dominated ethnicity was appointed prime minister. The battle to consolidate the legacy of political and military dominance of a section of Nigeria over the rest of the Federation began with increased intensity. A first and second census was highly disputed alleged to be riddled with malpractices and inflation of figures of such astronomical proportions that the Eastern Region refused to accept the result. The general election of 1964 was alleged to be neither free nor fair. All devices imaginable were said to have been used by the ruling parties in the regions to eliminate opponents (Atofarati, 1992). Civil war chances are high when there is political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization and weakness; there is an opportunity for a separatist or center seeking rebellion.

The Chairman of the Electoral Commission admitted there were proven irregularities. The president, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe refused to appoint a prime minister in the light of these allegations. The president and the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the northern region, were each seeking the support of the Armed Forces. This marked the first involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan politics. For four fearful days, the nation waited until the President announced that he had appointed the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form a broad based government (Atofarati, 1992).

According to Cotton 2007, the notion of state failure is employed in several related but methodologically distinct senses. The major indicator of a failing state is its lack of capacity to exercise juridical sovereignty in the international system. An erosion or disappearance of Legitimacy is the focus of these approaches.

Rigging and irregularities in the Western Region election of 1965 were alleged to be more brazen and more shameful. Law and order broke down completely leading to an almost complete state of anarchy. Arson and indiscriminate killings were committed by a private army of thugs of political parties. Law abiding citizens lived in constant fear of their lives and properties. This was the state of affairs when the coup of 15 January 1966 took place. The aim of the coup was to establish a strong, unified and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. The outcome of coup was a change of political balance in the country. It is this struggle that eventually degenerated into coup, counter coup and a bloody civil war (Atofarati, 1992). Civil war chances are high when a regime mixes democratic with autocratic features; as this is likely to indicate political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state incapacity.

What constitutes a failed state has varied, therefore, according to the perspective. It would seem that there are at least two kinds of ‘state failure’. According to the first, the state atrophies, its revenues decline, its capacities diminish and its place is taken by local civil society and/or ‘traditional’ hierarchies and/or international forces/agencies. Alternatively, elements of the state become predatory, disputes over resources and revenues emerge, conflict increases, and humanitarian dislocation occurs. Perhaps there is a third sense of failure, which would entail (as in North Korea and Zimbabwe) the state becoming essentially criminalized (Cotton, 2007, 456). The third case was more prevalent in the case of newly independent Nigeria

As a means of holding the country together, Nigeria was divided into twelve states from the original four regions in May 1967. Following the act of the creation of states by decree without consultation, the former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu declared the Region an independent state of Biafra. The Federal Government saw this as an act of secession and illegal. Several meetings were held to resolve the issue peacefully without success. To avoid disintegration of the country, the central government was left with only one choice of bringing back the Region to the main fold by force (Harold, 1982).


Perceived Tribalism, Religionism and Genocide (Grievance*)

The first coup was carried out on January 15, 1966, known as the coup of the "Five Majors," carried out by Igbo officers, led by Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna which had toppled the parliament and therefore, the government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. An Igbo Army general, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi was installed as president, the country’s first military head of state.

Gen. Ironsi was thought to have promoted many Igbo’s in the Army at the expense of Yoruba and Hausa officers, and was accused of perpetuating the brutal slayings of Yoruba and Hausa leaders. The Northerners in particular saw it as a deliberate plan to eliminate the political heavy weights in the North in order to pave way for the Easterners to take over the leadership role from them. Resentment grew in the North, culminating in the May 1966 riots throughout the North during which most Easterners (Igbo’s) residing in the North were attacked and killed (Atofarati, 1992).

In response to the Igbo-led coup, the Northerners and Islamic-faith-dominated Nigerian army led a coup against the Head of State, Maj. Gen Aguiyi Ironsi who was killed along with many other senior officers of the Igbo ethnicity. But as the military took over, the economic situation worsened, ethnic tensions broke out (Atofarati, 1992). This back to back coup led to an increase in ethnic tension and violence.

Claims of Genocide

After three anxious days of fear, doubts and non-government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, who at the time was the most senior officer of Northern origin and then the Chief of Staff in the Nigerian Army, emerged as the new Nigerian political leader. The lack of planning and the revengeful intentions of the second coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion and the scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the country. Even the authors of the coup could not stem the general lawlessness and disorder, the senseless looting and killing which spread through the North like wild fire on 29 September 1966. The Northern initiated coup, which was mostly motivated by ethnic and religious reasons, was a bloodbath of both military officers and civilians, especially those of the Igbo tribe. In the anti-Igbo riots, up to 30,000 Ibos were killed in fighting with Hausas, and around 1million refugees fled to their Ibo homeland in the east (Reopening Nigeria’s Civil WarWounds, BBC, 2007).

Troops of Eastern Nigeria origin serving elsewhere in the country were officially and formally released and posted to Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region (Biafra), while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu moved to Kaduna and Lagos (Nigeria). This marked the beginning of division and disunity within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces:

This simple and seemingly innocuous action broke the last thread and split the last institution symbolizing Nigeria's nationhood and cohesion which had been regularly tampered with by the politicians since 1962. The rift between the Eastern Region and the rest of the country was total (Atofarati, 1992).

The violence against the Igbo’s increased their desire for autonomy and protection from the Northerners’ military wrath. The military governor of the Igbo-dominated southeast, Col. Ojukwu, citing the Northern massacres and electoral fraud, proclaimed with southern parliament the secession of the south-eastern region from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra, an independent nation on 30 May 1967 (Atofarati, 1992).

Finance and Arms Availability (Opportunity *)

In general each combatant in an armed internal conflict chooses whether to acquire arms, forego acquiring arms, or disarm to some degree. In internal conflict both governments and armed opposition groups possess a variety of potential methods to obtain weapons. A link is likely between arms acquisitions and escalation, particularly by the military of a state embroiled in an ethnic dispute. In the case of Sri Lanka for example, arms acquisitions by the military were prompted by prior ethnic fighting and escalation, and by the military’s intention for subsequent escalation and dominance (Sislin, 2006).

Before the fighting began, Lt. Col. Ojukwu seized the Federal Government property and funds in the East. He planned the hijacking of a National commercial aircraft Fokker 27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos. All these and other signs and reports convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu's intention to secede. Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal Government, imposed a total blockade of the East. It was realized that more stringent action had to be taken to weaken support for Ojukwu and to forestall his secession bid (Atofarati, 1992).

The month of June of 1967 was used by both sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its military arsenal and moved troops to the border watching and waiting. At the dawn of 6 July 1967, the first bullet was fired signaling the beginning of the grisly 30 month civil war and carnage (Atofarati, 1992).

As stated by Sislin (2006), arms do play a role in a conflict’s progression. Just as the government of Southern Rhodesia pump-primed the Renamo rebellion in Mozambique while in the case of the Nigerian civil war, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union supplied Nigeria with arms while France sent Biafra weapons.

Photographs of starving children with huge distended stomachs from protein deficiency horrified people around the world. U.S. and European relief organizations, private groups and religious groups came to the assistance of the Biafrans in response to Biafran propaganda stressing the genocide of the Igbo. Airlifts brought food, medical supplies and arms to the war zones during the nights (Henryka and Himmelstrand, 1978).


International Recognition and Sympathy (Opportunity ***)

On May 30, 1967, Col. Ojukwu formally announced that Biafra would be an independent Republic. Several peace accords especially the one held at Aburi, Ghana (the 1968 Aburi Accord) collapsed. In July army combat units were dispatched to the east, but were met with rebel troops. Biafrans retaliated by taking control of strategic points in the mid-western region.

Conversely, only five nations recognized the Republic of Biafra, although socialist movements in many countries tried to give moral and material support. The Organization of African Unity, the papacy, and others tried to reconcile the combatants. Most countries continued to recognize Gen. Gowon’s regime as the government of all Nigeria. On the other hand, international sympathy for the plight of starving Biafran children brought airlifts of food and medicine from many countries.

One determinant of the prospects for insurgency is the availability of third-party support to either the rebels or the government of the state in question Fearon and Laitin, 2003). C te d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia recognized Biafra as an independent state (Green, 1967), but the absence of international support from political superpowers could have weakened the resolve of the secession movement of Biafra. However, the finance and arms availability factor ties in with the international recognition and sympathy factor, because the former may have been induced by the later.


Interpretation

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) showed that most proxies for grievance were insignificant: inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance had adverse effects. Collier and Hoeffler pointed that even this factor has to be considered in combination with the benign effects of social fractionalization: societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity are safer than homogenous societies as long as they avoid dominance.

Fearon and Laitin 2003 show that the conditions such as state weakness marked by poverty, a large population, and instability were better predictors of civil war than ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions or languages.

The presence of a rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war, and so should the availability of foreign, cross border sanctuaries and a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). But in Nigeria, the factor of Geography does not appear to have contributed to the opportunity to fight for secession. This observation is in accordance with Collier and Hoeffler’s 2004 findings that show a weak relationship between mountainous terrain and rebels’ advantage.

Collier and Hoeffler, (2004) suggested that both opportunities and grievances increase with population. This result is compatible with both the opportunity and grievance accounts; however, grievances increase with population due to rising heterogeneity. Fearon and Laitin (2003), hypothesize that among countries with an ethnic minority comprising at least 5% of the population, greater ethnic diversity should associate with a higher risk of ethnic civil war. This finding was evident in the case in Nigeria of 1967, with a population of 60 million people, 15 million of whom were Biafrans. However, I could not assess how significant the population size factored in the outbreak of the war, other than the inherent fact that grievances increases with population.

Among the factors listed in the James Fearon and David Laitin’s Civil War Hypothesis, only factors B, C, and G appeared relevant to the outbreak of this civil war:


Conclusion

Contrary to some of the findings of Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin, in my assessment of the Nigerian civil war, grievances such as ethnic rivalry and ethnic dominance, polarization/ regionalism, perceived tribalism and religionism, and perceived income inequality were very significant in the outbreak of the war (the demand for Biafra’s independence). The most significant opportunities were weak democracy and state capacity, availability of oil, international recognition and sympathy, finance and the availability of arms. However, these factors influenced the outcome of the war more so than the outbreak of the war.

Also, the factors of opportunities were mostly devalued by the might and size of the Nigerian side. Take for example, military advantage. Nigeria received arms, diplomatic support, and military training from Britain and the Soviet Union, while Biafra received arms from France. However, Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal Government, imposed a total blockade of the East (Biafra side). The Want-away country was only recognized by weak players such as C te d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia. The powerful nations did not recognize Biafra.

Based on the assessment of Fearon and David Laitin’s Civil War Hypothesis, the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war occurred because; there was political instability at the center, which indicated disorganization and weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center seeking rebellion; the government at the time was a mix of democratic and autocratic ideals as it sought to stay independent of Britain; an indication of political contestation among competing forces and weak state capacity; and the country’s revenue was chiefly derived from oil exports.

Availability of oil is perhaps the single most significant opportunity factor. Even though weak state capacity gave Biafra the opportunity to rebel and the dare to secede, the military size and financing of the Nigerian side thwarted any chances of victory. International recognition played a strong part in frustrating and ending the rebellion; however this paper does not asses weather a pre-perceived international support influenced the declaration of independence.

The introduction of perceptions to the grievance and opportunity factors allows for the possibility that both opportunities and grievances might be wrongly perceived. As stated by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), if the perceived opportunity for rebellion is illusory – analogous to the `winners’ curse’ – unprofitability will cause collapse, perhaps before reaching our threshold for civil war. By contrast, when exaggerated grievances trigger rebellion, fighting does not dispel the misperception and indeed may generate genuine grievances.



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Biafra - A Recent History (Part I - II)

By Astra Navigo, Subversify

(Coat of arms of the Republic of Biafra – 1967 – 1970)


It is better even from the point of survival to fight and be conquered than to surrender without fighting.

– George Orwell

Biafra lives.

– Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (President; Biafra – 1967-’70)

5 July; 1967.

The day dawned hot and muggy in the thick forest canopy in eastern Nigeria, on the border of the new nation of Biafra. Early June saw the arrival of two Nigerian army artillery regiments, along with two regiments of Nigerian infantry, to the border.

The time had long passed to negotiate the many injustices suffered by the people east of the Niger River. All that was left was war.

The first shells began falling shortly after midnight.

_________________________

Created from necessity, Biafra existed as a response to the arbitrary ‘political construct’ of Nigeria from the ashes of the former British colony of the same name. The three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Falani, and Igbo) had never lived harmoniously; each had their own region; each their own culture, religious beliefs, and ethics.

The Hausa and Falani were more in number, but less-educated. The Igbo, primarily in eastern Nigeria, had a culture of hard work and education. Most of the professional-class of Nigeria, and most of the officer-corps of the army came from Igbo stock; the working-classes and enlisted military personnel from the Hausa and Falani.

This divide was never addressed by the colonial government, nor was it addressed by the Nigerian government which followed independence in 1960. While education was available, it was never pursued as aggressively by the Hausa and Falani.

Through the first of the 1960’s, the social fabric of Nigeria, absent the controlling ‘lid’ of British troops, began to come apart. Igbo’s who worked in the north and west of Nigeria were increasingly the targets of mass killings. Mobs of Hausa and Falani targeted the Igbo minority, first in the ‘strongholds’ of Hausa and Falani territory; then in the south-eastern part of Nigeria traditionally held as ‘Igboland’.

By 1966, the Igbo had had enough.
Igbo from all parts of Nigeria began moving ‘home’ to the south-eastern part of the country. A coup by General Yakubu Gowon in 1966 put a final end to democracy in Nigeria. Not long after, an increase in ethnic violence, targeted toward the Igbo, reached the point of genocide.

In May of 1967, then-Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, (commander of the eastern military district of Nigeria) in concert with other army officers, academics, and politicians, declared the independence of eastern Nigeria under the ancestral name of ‘Biafra’.

Biafra held some pretty important cards in the early stages of its bid for independence.

As a nation, it was better-educated. Most of the nation’s physicians were of Igbo ancestry; the core-cadre of military officers were nearly all Igbo, and the nation’s universities were staffed by Igbo professors.

Their culture of hard work and creativity were also a formidable asset – and combined with their desire for independence and autonomy, would have a telling effect on the longevity of the nation.

Biafra was a nation rich in resources; the country could boast of wood, water, minerals, plenty of arable land, and one of the region’s best deep-water ports (Port Harcourt).

Biafra also had oil.

Most of the nation’s then-known oil reserves, along with the refineries, were in the new nation of Biafra. Nigerian LSW (light sweet crude) is, in some cases, so good that upon extraction it can be put in a ship’s fuel tanks and simply fired with no need of further refinement. This was Nigeria’s single-greatest cash-convertible asset, and with that asset in Biafran control, the future of Nigeria as a nation was seriously in doubt.

Nigeria In Trouble

Mu je Mu Kerkeshe Su,
TuTatara Kayan Su,
Mu Ber Su Suna Kukan Banza.

(We go, we slaughter them,
We destroy their goods,
We abandon them; crying useless tears)

– Nigerian war slogan; translated from Hausa, broadcast at the beginning of the invasion of Biafra; July; 1967

Nigeria was in trouble.

As a nation, they had seen the majority of their talent, plus one of their deep-water ports and their largest single export-item fall into the hands of a people who were now calling themselves a ‘nation’.

They had a large army, but no air force, and a few gunboats to protect their coastline. They were ill equipped to do much of anything save for throwing massive numbers of troops at their enemy – and, as most of the officer-corps were Igbo, they were now squarely entrenched across the Niger, training a new Biafran army to resist any invasion.

The Nigerian government was faced with two possibilities: (1) A protracted war to recover land and assets, or (2) grant Biafra its independence, and become an insignificant neighbor of the new nation.

Nigeria chose to fight.

The initial incursions into Biafra were thrown back with massive casualties. While accurate records do not exist, consistent numbers from a low of 20,000 to a high of 75,000 Nigerian dead are quoted. By July, it was apparent that the Biafrans held the upper hand.

Biafra, for its part, knew from Ojukwu on down that failure was not an option. The Nigerian government, from the very beginning, clearly acted in a manner which left little doubt that the war would be a war of civilian attrition in order to destroy the Igbo people. Resources were secondary; this was a war of tribe-against-tribe, for the freedom of a people.

Biafran troops slashed forward into Nigeria, and came within 25 miles of the capital of Lagos. Rioting and looting broke out; both the British government and the Johnson administration in Washington informed the Gowon government in Lagos that they should remain in place, rather than evacuate Lagos and surrender to the Biafrans. President Ojukwu was anticipating a quick end to the war.

Biafran B-26’s bombed Nigerian advance positions in unopposed daylight raids. Biafran technology was minimal, but the Biafran ‘brain trust’ began to be felt in the form of short-range guided rockets which were used to devastating effect on government positions. It was clear that the Gowon government needed an air force.

They were obliged by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union, which sent five MiG-17’s and four Ilushin Il-28 bombers, along with advisors and technicians, to Nigeria. Egyptian and British pilots eagerly flew the MiGs while Nigerian pilots were in training.

Great Britain came to the aid of its former colony with small arms, uniforms, transport vehicles and other aid, along with pilots and technicians.

Biafra received the weapons (including some tanks) from the recently-concluded Six Day War fought between Israel and Egypt-and-its-allies (along with official recognition by Israel); several nations (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa) officially recognized Biafra as a nation – but material support was not forthcoming from those new diplomatic recognitions.

It is important to note that recognition by the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia did nothing to endear the Biafran government to the newly-independent African nations, and in reality prevented many African nations from formally recognizing Biafra and coming to its aid due to the apartheid regime in South Africa as well as the ‘whites-only’ government of Rhodesia.

Biafra established a foreign office in Lisbon, Portugal, from which it actively recruited volunteers from many nations in Europe, as well as set about attempting to purchase munitions and arrange for civilian aid. Repeated requests for aid from the United States were met by deaf ears; the Johnson administration considered Biafra to be a ’side show’, which held little in the way of American interest.

Meantime, the effect of the new Nigerian air force began to be felt in earnest.

The Nigerians began to bomb civilian targets in Onitsha (on the Niger River border) and Enugu; the capital of Biafra had to be moved as a result to a city more-inland (Umuahia). MiG-17’s began shooting down relief planes (clearly marked with the symbol of the International Red Cross); Red Cross relief efforts were suspended as negotiations continued with the Nigerian government to open ’safe corridors’ for relief flights. While this was ongoing, Biafra began to starve.

Ojukwu, Oxford-educated and one of Nigeria’s wealthiest men in his own right, pledged and spent his personal fortune (around $40M U.S.) for supplies. Ojukwu also used his personal relationships with wealthy Europeans to arrange for supplies and munitions for the new nation. None of this, however, was nearly enough to prevent the Nigerians from invading Biafra.

The Biafran capital at Enugu fell in late September, 1967, after a combined Nigerian air/land campaign. It was during this time that General Murtala Mohammed, a Hausa from northern Nigeria, began his ’scorched earth’ campaign against Biafra.

At this point, 5,000 Biafrans were dying, daily.

Rapidly, things began to turn against Biafra.

Biafra: A Recent History (Part III - IV)

By Astra Navigo, Subversify

“As I have said before, and I repeat, the war we are fighting is an imperialist war, waged by Britain and Russia in an unholy alliance and with the tacit acquiescence of the United States, and fought by proxy.”

“I see Biafra as a bastion of the free in an age in which freedom and self-determination are conditioned by the color of the skin. I would go further to say that for the acceptance of the black race, there must be a Biafra. If this Biafra is stifled, then perhaps in the future another will emerge.”

– Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (Radio Biafra broadcasts; November/December; 1968)

By August of 1967, Biafra had been forced to withdraw from the occupied territories in Nigeria gained during its incursions in July and August. Back behind its original borders, Ojukwu could do nothing to prevent the destruction of most of his air force by the new Nigerian MiGs. By September, three Nigerian regiments had crossed the Niger into Biafra. With the abandonment of the capitol at Enugu for the inland city of Umuahia in September, 1967, Biafra was effectively on the defensive.

Now, his forces spread thin (augmented by European volunteers and mercenaries committed to his cause of freedom), Ojukwu had to make the choice between losing his country, and losing his one deep-water port, Port Harcourt, in the south of Biafra.

Port Harcourt is on the shores of the Bight of Biafra, which in turn is part of the Atlantic Ocean. One of the world’s largest river-deltas, the Niger River delta comprises the gateway to Port Harcourt, and is a natural ‘staging area’ for the large numbers of ships which come to Port Harcourt every day, bringing supplies to Biafra, as well as taking the oil which was such a vital part of the Biafran economy.

Ojukwu’s dilemma was plain – with the pressure of Nigerian troop-columns threatening his capital, he had to maintain sufficient forces in the field in western Biafra to counter this threat – but he also had to maintain Port Harcourt at all costs, defending the city while it was under siege.

He chose to fight a delaying-action, surrendering over 150 miles of territory as the Nigerian army pushed east, but holding the coast-district against the onslaught of Nigerian artillery and Egyptian/British-flown MiGs and Ilushin bombers. Savage fighting continued through most of the fall and winter of 1967-1968. Reinforced by additional mercenaries, volunteers, and Biafran regulars, the Biafran army managed to hold out through most of spring, 1968.

All the while, Biafrans were starving.

“By the beginning of April, 1968, the truth about Biafra and the genocide being perpetrated by Nigerians was filtering in increasing volume to the outside world,” said President Ojukwu in a broadcast over Radio Biafra in the summer of 1968. In truth, the Biafran famine was far worse than the media presented.

By this time, the failure of harvest (Nigeria had occupied most of the Biafran farmland close to the border near the Niger River) and the war itself was claiming 50,000 Biafran lives monthly.

Barring a miracle, Biafra was on borrowed time.

Map of the Republic of Biafra — 1967 – 1970)

“For nearly ten months now, we have been fighting a hard and bitter war in defense of our lives and property and the future of our children against Nigeria’s calculated war of destruction and genocide. The immediate tragic circumstances which culminated in this war are well known to all of us….”

– President Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu; broadcast of 31 March; 1968

“In Africa, a thing can be true at first light, and a lie by noon.”

– Ernest Hemingway

On 12 May, 1968, fifty thousand troops of the Nigerian Third Marine Commando under General Adekunle and his second-in-command, General Obasanjo, made an amphibious landing south of the Biafran city of Port Harcourt in the Niger River delta. At the same time, the Nigerian Air Force stepped up its bombing raids on Port Harcourt, attacking the outer-ring of Port Harcourt’s defenses round-the-clock.

Over fifty thousand Nigerian regulars, mainly Hausa troops from the north with no love for the Igbo, were chosen to assault the land-based defenses to the west of the city. The outcome left little in doubt.

Toward the end, broadcasts from Radio Biafra grew strident in its pleas for military, medical, and United Nations assistance. Biafran troops, out of ammunition, threw gasoline bombs on advancing Nigerian troop-carriers and fought hand-to-hand with fixed bayonets as the Nigerian troops pushed deeper into the city.

On 23 May, 1968, Port Harcourt fell.

Four brigades (about 20,000 effectives) of Biafran troops streamed through the now-chaotic city northward toward the city of Owerri to make what might be a final stand.

General Adekunle, commander of the Third Marine Commando (Nigerian Army), simply let his mainly-Hausa troops have the run of the city for nearly a week.

Bayoneting anyone who resisted, the Third Marines engaged in a chaotic ‘suppression’ of the Port Harcourt population, raping women at will, murdering their husbands and children, and looting with abandon.

Entering the Port Harcourt hospital, they bayoneted the wounded Biafran soldiers who could not evacuate, as well as the physicians who stayed behind; raped nurses and new mothers in the maternity wards, looted all medical supplies, and eventually returned to their units.

This complete breakdown in discipline on the part of Nigerian Third Marine Commando bought the remnants of the Biafran defenders badly-needed time to establish their perimeters around Owerri – but at a civilian cost of over 50,000 Biafran lives during the week-long orgy of murder, looting, and rape in Port Harcourt.

Biafra had lost its one deep-water port capable of bringing supplies to the nation via the sea. It had also lost its major population center, plus the oil resources so badly needed to fuel its economy.

In August, over 2,000 short-range rockets and millions of rounds of badly-needed ammunition began arriving at the airfield near Owerri. At the same time, the OAU (Organization of African Unity) began to lobby the international community for aid.

Ojukwu has long been criticized for his rejection of land-haulage for food-aid – however, there is a long –standing west African tradition of using poison to eliminate one’s enemies, and an equally-long tradition of failing to differentiate between civilian and military personnel in this endeavor; it may well be that the Biafran government wanted to prevent this possibility.

Ojukwu demanded airlift-only as a means of resupply; it’s often been suggested that he wanted this method so he could fly in arms along with food supplies; however, there’s little practical evidence that this occurred.

What is known is this – by the end of 1968, over 200,000 Biafrans were dying monthly, due to the Nigerian blockade of all road-entries to Biafra, plus the crowding of Biafra’s population into a land-area a little less than one-half of the original size of the nation.

Contacted repeatedly by the Biafran foreign-office in Lisbon, Portugal, the United States was content to do nothing, either to support a nation seeking its independence, or to provide material relief for the Biafran civilian population.

Reinforced by fresh volunteers and French munitions, the Biafran army went on a counter-offensive in October of 1968. This resulted in large numbers of Nigerian army casualties along with the capture of Owerri by the Biafran army, but eventually resulted in a stalemate by spring of 1969 as the Biafrans ran out of ammunition, food and other supplies.

Airlift of arms and supplies were neither enough nor of any frequency to sustain the life of the population nor the viability of the army. What followed – from early 1969 until the end – is a shameful chapter in modern history.

Nigeria, with the tacit agreement of the international community and with the active support of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, having squeezed the population of Biafra into an area around half its original size, was allowed to simply starve Biafra into submission. During 1969, Biafrans died daily at a horrendous rate. At the peak of Biafra’s suffering, it’s been estimated that nearly 250,000 Biafrans were dying monthly.

On 22 December, 1969, the Gowon government launched its final offensive. Starving; Biafran troops could do no more. They simply threw down their weapons and faded into the jungle. Nigerian columns advanced unopposed, cutting Biafra in two and rendering the nation indefensible and the situation hopeless. Nigerian troops began a systematic process of killing every male over the age of ten, raping and mutilating the women of childbearing-age, and destroying anything that might be of value.

On 13 January, 1970, President Ojukwu fled with most of the Biafran government to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. The remainder of the Biafran army capitulated later that day.

The war for Biafran independence — which held such promise both for the region and the world — was over.

“Blockaded and besieged, we had no alternative but to cry out as loud as we could, so that, should we perish, somewhere, some people in the world, men of good will, would at least record the fact that at one time we did exist.

May I take this opportunity to thank all those persons and organizations that have sacrificed that we might live – that we assure them that their sacrifice will not have been in vain.

Biafra lives. The struggle continues. Long live the Republic of Biafra.”

– Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (President; Biafra – broadcast-from-exile; January, 1970)

“The world is a fine place, and worth fighting for.”

– Ernest Hemingway

As an apologetic for Nigerian statehood, Biafra stood in sharp contrast to the artificiality of Nigeria. Biafra was the proof-made-manifest that political-constructs using arbitrary borders do not work in regions where familial and tribal affiliations hold sway.

These lessons were learned in Biafra, as they were to be learned later in Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, and in Iraq in present day.

Biafra was also proof that the definition of genocide is very much determined by money, power and skin color – nearly the same number of ethnic Igbos were killed between 1967-1970 as the number of Jewish people during the events in Europe between 1937-1945 – but Biafra was denied support for its nationhood and any form of United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping or aid relief.

The expected reprisals after the fall of Biafra never occurred, largely due to pressure from both the British and U.S. governments to end the war quietly – it was believed that there was still a danger of Biafra rising again due to popular support if the Gowon government completed its genocide. As a result, the entire war, along with its atrocities, were metaphorically ‘swept under the rug’ by the international community.

Tactically, the war was lost in September, 1967, when the original capital at Enugu was lost and Biafra went over to a defensive posture.

Strategically, the war was lost when Port Harcourt fell, and in spite of the recognition of Biafra by several west African states at that time, those recognitions did little to enhance Biafra’s stance in the eyes of the rest of the world. Deprived of its only deep-water port, its oil-reserves, half of its land-area and nearly all of its arable land, and with its population concentrated together in a manner which invited disease along with starvation, the question most people ask is “why did Ojukwu attempt to hold Biafra together, when there was little hope of winning?”

The answer is plainly obvious to most of us who’ve studied the phenomenon in any depth – given the alternative between an uncertain future at the hands of a known enemy, and a certain future – even death- with one’s ‘own’ – a person will choose the familiar over the unfamiliar; the miserable company of one’s own people over the ill-treatment of foreigners.

Statistics:

– Exact numbers are not possible after this time, but numbers between 2,000,000 and upward of 5,000,000 Biafrans dead of starvation, disease, and direct military action (wounds) during the war have been suggested.

– While reprisals never materialized after Biafra’s capitulation, the Igbo continue to be repressed. Many have left their homeland for more-peaceful lives in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, where their talents are more welcome.

– The land east of the Niger River has never fully recovered from the thirty months of war which marked the existence of the Biafran Republic. To this day, the Igbo are persecuted.

– The United States government has never admitted any failure surrounding the events in Biafra from 1967-1970. To this date, the U.S. has no foreign policy which adequately addresses Africa.

– Nigeria continues to suffer from the effects of military dictatorship and corruption to this day.

Personalities:

– President Ojukwu returned from exile in 1980 to the acclaim of over a million people who lined the Owerri airport to welcome him home. He lives quietly in Nnewe, in eastern Nigeria.

– President Gowon saw a brief transition to democracy, then a descent into more chaotic military dictatorships, being overthrown in a coup in 1975. He lives comfortably today in Lagos, Nigeria. He was never called to account for his responsibility regarding the genocide in Biafra.

– General Murtala Mohammed was never called to answer for his crimes against humanity or genocide against Biafra. The international airport in Lagos is named after him. He was installed by coup as Gowon’s replacement in 1975; his rule was cut short in another coup attempt in 1976, when his limousine was ambushed in Lagos traffic.

– Neither General Adekunle nor General Obasanjo (the two architects of the Biafran genocide-by-starvation) were held accountable for their crimes. In fact, Adekunle said, “I want to prevent even one Igbo having one piece to eat before their capitulation,” in response to a question regarding his strategy. Adekunle now lives in retirement, and has recently published a memoir; Obasanjo is the current president of Nigeria.

________________________

On an academic level, I’d be remiss if I didn’t say I’d never have been able to complete either my masters’ thesis in college or this small series if the good people at Harper; Row hadn’t had the courage to publish the collected thoughts and speeches of President Ojukwu in their fine book “Biafra”, released in 1969. I’ve had a first-edition for many years; it survived my housefire and is a book I’ve read several times since I bought it for $1.50 at the used-book sale in college.

Fredrick Forsyth’s book, “The Biafra Story” contributed greatly to my understanding of the conflict.

There is much which was left out of this story for clarity’s sake – the miniCOIN Airforce of Swedish Count vonRosen makes for a grand tale; the memoirs of Rolf Steiner, the mercenary officer from Germany, also offered invaluable perspective.

I’m also indebted to the website Biafraland.Com, which provides much in the way of anecdotal material and other information about the land to the east of the Niger.

____________________________

On a personal level – when Biafra seceded from Nigeria, I was 12 years old. While other boys were out playing softball, a combination of personal interest and a touch of asthma kept me indoors, either reading or listening to my shortwave radio (a gift from Dad – he told me he’d give me his old Zenith when he knew I’d use it).

I had followed the problems in Nigeria, right along with the war in Vietnam, the Six-Day War in the Middle East, and (later) the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union.

Upon Biafra’s secession, I thought – ‘these people are in the right – the U.S. will have to do something for them!” I put a map of Nigeria on my wall, and followed the troop-movements, gleaned from broadcasts and magazine clippings.

I asked my Dad when he thought the Biafrans would win. He said, “Actually, son, I think they’re going to lose this one.” I was crestfallen. They were a new nation; certainly deserving of freedom.

I was 12 then. I had much to learn.

____________________________

References:

Surviving in Biafra: The Story of the Nigerian Civil War (Alfred Obiora Uzokwe; 2003) Writers’ Advantage Press

The Biafra Story (Frederick Forsyth; 1969; 2001) – Cooper Press; UK

The Selected Speeches of Lt. Col. Ojukwu (Biafran Govt. Press; Onitsha, Biafra – 1967)

War Stories – A Memoir of Nigeria and Biafra (John Sherman; 2002) Mesa Verde Press

Shadows – Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria, 1967-’70 (Michael Draper; Hikoki Press; 1999)

The Last Adventurer (Rolf Steiner; Boston/Little/Brown Press; 1978)

American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1966-1970

Biafra (President Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu; Harper and Row; 1969)

Heinz Herrmann: My father in learning

By Mark Nwangwu, Vanguard

THE most important duty of parents is to bring up their children to know and understand what is right and what is wrong; to be a person of good character. Better put, parents lead their children to live a life of virtue, of value, in all the circumstances that they, the children, may encounter. This learning experience takes place early in life and soon, one is ready to leave home, to face the world, armed with the truth of one's upbringing and the strength of one's character.

Professor Heinz Herrmann, who passed on in the early hours of October 18, 2009, was a man who nurtured me in the character of learning. He created a laboratory where learning and the pursuit of truth were the highest goals of human life. I was already twenty-nine and had my doctorate, when I first came to Prof. Herrmann's lab in 1966 on a post-doctoral fellowship paid entirely from his grants. If I had not learnt right from wrong, and did not know what it meant to live a life of virtue, then I was a lost soul. But science did not yet flow in my veins and I had not acquired a character in science. A whole new world awaited me in Prof. Herrmann's lab!

Having completed the study of medicine and a research assistantship in biochemistry at the University of Vienna and postdoctoral training in Copenhagen, Heinz arrived in the U.S. in 1939. After a stint at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, he started his studies of embryonic development, first at Yale and the University of Colorado Medical School, transferring his work to the University of Connecticut in 1959 with the tenure of a research professorship of the American Cancer Society. He was for ten years director of the Institute of Cell Biology and participated in the foundation of the American Society of Cell Biology. This was the man who was to shape my life in science.

1965 was a difficult year in Western Nigeria and, foreseeing a life in which I could not readily put my knowledge to use, I wrote to Prof. Herrmann applying for a post-doctoral fellowship. He had sent me a reprint of an article he had published when I was doing my Ph.D. research. I was later to learn that he had received numerous requests for this prized article but had kept the last copy. When he received my request for this same article, he told his post-graduate students that he would send it out because it was likely to be far more significant to this student from Africa than to others in the United States. Indeed, that article was monumental in my life!

The University of Connecticut, Storrs, offered me the fellowship and I was beside myself with joy. Then began a long series of correspondence to arrange for our flight tickets to the US - for myself, my wife, Helen and our two children. Finally, the university agreed to pay for our tickets and to deduct the cost from my first-year fellowship stipend. This was 1966 - The Federal Government had been overthrown in the January coup; Major-General Ironsi had been killed in the July counter-coup, and pogroms had been visited on Nigerians of non-northern descent, principally the Igbo. I had applied for tickets for the journey: Port-Harcourt - Calabar - Tiko - Douala - Paris - New York - Hartford. Now wait for this: all four tickets arrived, by registered mail, at Nkwogwu Postal Agency, in my hometown, Nguru, in then Eastern Nigeria, in October, 1966. We were all packed to travel and left a few days later. Prof. Herrmann met us at Hartford airport and drove us to Storrs, where a two-bedroom university accommodation was waiting for us at 10 Mansfield Apartments. Heinz had borrowed all sorts of furniture for our use and assisted with our settling in.

My work now began. Heinz had three Ph.D. students one of whom, Arthur William Rourke took me through many essential laboratory techniques and was ever so gracious. We became close friends and when his daughter Elizabeth arrived, Art chose me as her godfather. Heinz put me to work on a project I did not particularly like but to which I gave my best. In the process, I learnt to purify the major muscle protein, myosin, free of any other protein. Some time in 1967, Dr. Stuart Mackenzie Heywood delivered a seminar at Storrs on his brilliant and groundbreaking work on myosin synthesis that made him a leading light in molecular biology. After the seminar, I was raving wild with immeasurable joy telling everyone that this was exactly the type of work I craved for. Heinz then threw the bombshell: Stuart would be joining the University of Connecticut and would work in his lab. Thus, my dream of working on molecular biology of development would be realised. Stu (as we fondly called him) and I went on to publish two seminal papers that announced a new dawn in the molecular biology of cells of higher organisms. Up till then, what was known about genetics at the molecular level came from studies of viruses and bacteria. What Stu did for me is beyond words: an urchin from Obetiti, Nguru now worked at the cutting edge of molecular biology. Heinz watched us with the satisfaction of a grand patron, giving us all the support we needed, making sure our first paper was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA, one of the most prestigious journals in science.

After I moved to Canada in 1969 as an assistant professor at Brock University, St. Catharines, I kept in touch with Heinz and Stu and they continued to guide me and support my efforts. I spent my sabbatical leave at the University of Ibadan in 1974-75 only to run into Heinz and his dear wife, Virginia at the University of Ibadan Senior Staff Club. They had come as tourists to Nigeria not expecting to see me! Helen was expecting our fourth child and was at the University College Hospital awaiting delivery. When our son arrived while Heinz was still in Nigeria, we named him Heinz after my father in learning. Years later, he entered a subscription to The Economist, lasting over six years, for his namesake, then an economics student. After his retirement in 1980, he wrote a textbook of Cell Biology and a book about the nature of understanding complex systems both of which he sent to me. The latter book informed my foray into biology and the social order.

Helen and I visited Heinz and Stu in the summer of 1989 and, with their wives and friends, we were treated to a sumptuous lunch and a most unforgettable afternoon. We visited Storrs again in 2001, and in 2003. By this time, Heinz was already in his nineties and after dinner by 8 p.m., his dear wife Virginia drove us back to Willimantic, about fifteen kilometres away, complaining that Heinz drove too fast for her liking! This was the last time Helen and I saw Heinz. I wrote him in August this year that we would like to pay him a visit. In his last e-mail to me on August 1, he wrote to say, much to our dismay:

"To my regret, we are unfit for a visit right now. With senile deterioration, loss of hearing, and other complications, it would be too difficult to be an adequate host. I would be grateful for any news regarding Ikemefula and if you have finished your autobiography. We follow news from Nigeria and have been thinking of you. With much fondness, Heinz."

Simple, affable and compassionate, Heinz lived a life of humility and sincerity. A man of unsurpassed honour and generosity has passed on; a master of the learning culture. I am exceedingly proud to say, he made me what I am in molecular biology. Above all, he was my father in learning.

Professor Nwagwu lives in Obetiti, Nguru, Imo State

Revisiting The Asaba Massacres

By Obi Nwakanma, Vanguard

My attempt this week is to bring some attention to the subject of the Asaba massacres, one of the haunting ghosts of Nigeria’s last civil war. I pay particular tribute to Emma Okocha – Onye Amuma Cable – author of Blood on the Niger, the chilling account of the Asaba massacres of October 7, 1967.


More than any other individual, Okocha has pursued the Asaba story with the temerity of a survivor, and the hardnosed instincts of a well-trained journalist. He has brought attention to the great evil that Nigerians love to forget: the attempt at selective annihilation of a people through acts of terrible war crimes.

Asaba has become Okocha’s life work; an obsession. He says it is to bring closure, and give final rest to those who perished that day in Asaba. But I suspect something much deeper and personal. Of course it is up close and personal for Emma Okocha. He is from Asaba; he survived the massacres; but his entire family perished.

The Igbo name their children, “Echezona/Echezola”- never forget, and “Odoemene/Ozoemena”- May this never happen again. These are names in recoil from harsh memory.

These I think are the profound sentiments that propel Okocha’s pursuit to reopen the case of the Asaba mass killings, compel the official acknowledgement of war crimes by the Nigerian government, and force a visible war memorial in honour of the dead of October 1967 – the “Asaba Memorial.”

Happily, Emma Okocha’s work is drawing attention to one of modern Africa’s darkest war crimes. Last week, the University of Southern Florida, Tampa, convened the Asaba Memorial symposium to reopen the issue, and unveil “the long-buried tragedy” led by the anthropologists Elizabeth Bird and Erin Kimmerle and Fraser Ottanelli, chairman of the department of history, in collaboration with the USF Libraries Holocaust and Genocide Studies Centre.

They have also recruited a Tampa Police homicide detective Charles Massucci to gather documents, record oral histories and to examine mass graves and recover evidence of the Asaba genocide.

Let me briefly place the Asaba tragedy in context for those who may either have forgotten, or who may not know about it, especially many contemporary Nigerians who may have been born after the war, and who ought to know the many evils that haunt Nigeria.

In May 1967, Eastern Nigeria declared secession from the old federation of Nigeria and declared itself the republic of Biafra. Eastern Nigerian secession naturally culminated in the Nigerian political crisis leading to the January 15, 1966 coup led by Emma Ifeajuna that overthrew the government of the first republic, and the July 29, 1966, led by Murtala Muhammed, and directed by Yakubu Gowon who subsequently took over as military head of state.

The July coup spiraled into the selective annihilation of all Igbo military officers and snowballed into a pogrom of the Igbo.

The Aburi agreements reached to stem the slide collapsed, and the Gowon administration in Lagos peremptorily dissolved the regions and created the twelve states on May 27, 1967, thus subverting as the government in the East saw it, the fundamental authority and rights of the regional governments, and complicating the East’s capacity to offer security to its people who had fled to it.

Odumegwu-Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern region, on advise from the Eastern Nigerian Consultative Assembly declared secession, and announced the independent republic of Biafra three days later, on May 30, 1967.

The stage was set for an epic conflict. The government in Lagos declared war and attacked Biafra on July 6, fighting from Ogoja and Nsukka. By September, the Biafran capital was threatened.

That September, however, Biafra launched its own attack, a diversionary and tactical move through the Midwest; brilliant in conception, but poor in execution.

Brigadier Victor Banjo, leading the “Liberation Army” from Onitsha, made a lightning move into Benin City and was close to taking Lagos and Ibadan, in what then seemed a cake walk, when he suddenly lost the will to fight.

Old Biafra intelligence sources hint that Banjo had been told in unmistakable terms, in his meeting with the deputy British high commissioner in Benin, that the Brits might be forced to provide logistical support to Gowon from the sea, and attack Lagos with its special forces already nearby, off the coasts.

The prospects of the Brits bombing Lagos and turning “Yorubaland” into a bloody battle field forced Banjo to stymie the Liberation Army in Benin City, and order a hasty withdrawal. It also allowed the federal troops led by Murtala Muhammed to reorganize and retake the Midwest. Asaba was doomed from that moment.

The massacre of Igbo civilians began from Benin City with the arrival of the federal forces. Folks in Benin went house by house identifying and killing their Igbo neighbours. Murtala’s Army already war drunk thus arrived Asaba with bloodlust.

The account of what happened in Asaba is well documented in Emma Okocha’s Blood on the Niger. It is also the subject of my poem, The Horsemen, an elegy to that era.

But to put it quite simply, the troops under Murtala Muhammed and the late Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, both of whom also ironically met death on the same day in 1976, supervised the killing of the adult males of Asaba.

They had ordered them to dance at the town square, separated the men from the women, and killed them.

Ironically, one of those killed was Sydney Asiodu, a potential Olympic medalist and undergraduate of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His brother, Philip Asiodu was then a super permanent secretary in Gowon’s administration in Lagos.

Even then, Asaba was only one of the places where the Nigerian military committed war crimes of such horrendous magnitude during that war, and have sought to cover it up and even erase them.

Many of those who have strutted about as Nigeria’s military heroes indeed ought to be brought to account for their war crimes.

It is the legacy of impunity that continues to haunt Nigeria, and continues to breed the kind of viciousness that would lead to the mindless destruction of people be it at Umuechem, Odi or Gboko because no one yet has been brought to account for such horrendous acts.

The Asaba memorial will be an important first step towards full disclosure and possible restitution.

Death of a Missionary Priest, Father Aengus Finucane

Written by John O'Shaughnessy, Limerick Post

FATHER Aengus Finucane, the former Chief Executive of the Third World charity Concern, and a native of Limerick, where he was made a Freeman of the City, has died, aged 77. He died in the Spiritan Fathers’ nursing home in Kimmage after a short illness. The late Fr Finucane is survived by two sisters and three brothers.

He was a product of Limerick CBS and later studied Philosophy, and was ordained a Holy Ghost priest in 1958.

The Nigerian civil war four decades ago catapulted him into emergency aid.

As a Spiritan missionary in Biafra, a region that was trying to breakaway from Nigeria, he was confronted with famine.

He joined parishioners in braving bombing raids to unload relief cargoes at a local airstrip.

Supporters of Fr Finucane and his fellow missionaries raised almost €4m and sent four shiploads of humanitarian aid. They founded Africa Concern.

Minister of State for Overseas Development, Peter Power, expressed deep regret at the death of Fr Aengus Finucane.

He said:

“As a fellow Limerick man, I would like to pay particular tribute to Fr Aengus Finucane, who always retained a great interest in the cultural and sporting life of the city, although he was often thousands of miles away.

“He was a marvellous ambassador for the city and this was recognised by the University of Limerick, who conferred on him an honorary Doctor of Laws. His passing will be much mourned in Limerick.

“He had been a tireless force for good across the globe for more than four decades. As a founder member of Concern, Fr Finucane harnessed his great energy, commitment and kindness to effect real improvements in the lives of the poor and those devastated by war and disaster.

“From Biafra in the late 1960s to Bangladesh in the 1970s and Rwanda more recently, Fr Finucane brought relief and hope to millions of people whose lives were blighted by poverty and injustice.

“More than three decades after he worked in Bangladesh, locals recently remembered him as a “giant of a man”, who not only provided food and clean water, but established training centres for women and schools for children. He provided material help, but also brought them hope and the opportunity to build their own lives.

“This is Fr Finucane’s legacy and we in Ireland, along with millions of people across the world, owe him a debt of gratitude. We extend our sympathies to his brother, Fr Jack, his family and his many friends and colleagues across the world”.

Concern’s current CEO Tom Arnold described Fr Finucane as one of the greatest men of his generation who used his gifts for the welfare of the world’s poorest people.

‘He had an absolute commitment to the poorest of the poor: his work with Concern saved countless lives and improved the lives of many millions of people”.

An Taoiseach Brian Cowen, described Fr Aengus as a great humanitarian and his life’s work was to help alleviate the suffering of the poorest of the poor.

“He has made a truly impressive contribution to improving the quality of life of people in the Third World and his courageous efforts saved a huge number of lives”.

President of the University of Limerick, Professor Don Barry, paid the following tribute: “Father Finucane worked tirelessly in the service of the world’s most disadvantaged peoples.

“His passing will leave a void that is as immeasurable as the number of lives touched by his contributions.

“He was champion for the poor, an advocate for the downtrodden and risked his life working in many of the world’s worst war zones. Father Finucane was an inspirational figure who never despaired in the face of new challenges. We would like to offer our condolences to Father Finucane’s family at this very sad time”.

Co-founder of photographic agency Press 22, Liam Burke spoke fondly of Father Finucane, “He was one of the most remarkable men I ever met. He inspired everyone who met him”.

Mr Burke, who first met Fr Finucane in 1989, said they recently watched the All-Ireland final together, “He was in great spirits, although he was a bit disappointed that Tipperary lost. He was always a great supporter of Limerick GAA”.

Although Father Finucane travelled to many nations carrying out humanitarian work, Mr Burke, who had travelled abroad with him in a professional capacity, said he had a soft spot for one country. “One of his favourite countries was Bangladesh, he spent many years there and always took any opportunity he had to go back”.

Liam described Father Finucane as a proud Limerickman, “He was very very proud of Limerick and he always defended it against its critics”.

Biafran Retrospect: Umu-Igbo Express Gratitude to a Man Who Saved Them

By Rev. Father Tobe Nnamani

Dr George Hussler and Rev Father Tobe Nnamani

Gabon 1970: A gift given to Dr Hussler by the Biafran children at "Village KM 11"

Rev. Dr. Hussler and Chief Joseph Mmeh

“Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all others.”

- Cicero-

Preamble

In April 1968, the survival of the nascent Republic of Biafra was hanging on the balance. After the fall of Enugu in September 1967, Biafran major cities continued to fall one after the other into the hands of the enemy. Consequently, what was left of the Biafran Secretariat consisted of a mobile van moved from one corner to the other. While major world powers watched with folded arms, debating on the proper interpretation and application of the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention in the OAU Charter, the Federal soldiers continued their ferocious onslaught on the defenseless Biafran population. They rampaged, pounded, bombed and shelled villages and towns including hospitals and schools with reckless abandon. The level of death-toll and human misery shocked the conscience of the international community. And, as Biafran borders continued to shrink by the day, the population density jumped from its pre-war level of 500 persons per square kilometer to 2,000. In spite of all these seemingly insurmountable odds, the Biafrans were determined to defend themselves to the last man or so it seemed. However, as a result of the total and suffocating blockade by land, sea and air, the resultant crushing effect of hunger and disease threatened to snuff life out of the fledging republic and its traumatized citizens. It was in the midst of this excruciating situation that the Christian Churches all over the world including Jewish Synagogues in America launched one of the greatest relief assistance in the history of humanitarian intervention.

One man who played a leading role in this timely intervention was Rev. Fr. Dr. Georg Hüssler, former President of Caritas International. This kind-hearted man of God celebrated his 88th Birthday on July 7, 2009. Prior to this date, the Co-ordinator of Nzuko Umuigbo World-Wide Inc., Chief Joe Mmeh did an effective networking; he sent out emails to many Umuigbo both home and abroad requesting them to send a congratulatory birthday message and _expression of gratitude to a man who gave them food when they were starving to death and thereby saved them from total annihilation. For, according to the Roman Poet Cicero, “gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues but, the parent of all others;” it is also an attitude that leads to beatitude. The response to this appeal was over-whelming as post-cards and emails poured into Dr. Hüssler’s letter and email boxes in waves. The content of this parent of all virtues was laden with emotions as many of those who sent them recounted the agony they or their parents and relatives went through and how they might not have seen the light of day without his timely intervention. To crown this out-pouring of gratitude and give it a somewhat personal touch, Chief Mmeh and the author paid a courtesy call on Father Hüssler on July 23, 2009 in his home in Freiburg/Breisgau, south-west Germany . The Octogenarian - still relatively strong, came to the door to meet us. After exchanging pleasantries, he took us down the memory lane and recounted with passion and astonishing picturesque details how Caritas (Relief Organisation founded in May 1946 in Germany) in tandem with other relief agencies and good-spirited individuals airlifted thousands of tons of relief materials to Uli Airstrip. The following is a sketch of the tit-bits from the meeting.

Who is Rev. Fr. Dr. Georg Hüssler?

Father Georg Hüssler was born on July 7, 1921 in Einöd , Saarland , Germany and grew up in Elsass. He was a medical student when World War II broke out; he enlisted into the Germany army and worked as a Sanitary Inspector. When the war ended, he proceeded to Rome where he studied Theology and was ordained priest in 1951. After his doctoral studies, he became an Assistant to the then President of German Caritas with Headquarters in Freiburg . He rose through the ranks to become the Secretary-General and later the President of German Caritas, a post he held for 22 years from 1969 to 1991.In between the time , he was also appoint President of Caritas International. Dr. Hüssler was decorated with three Honours by the three tiers of government in Germany , namely; the local government of his city Freiburg , the State government of Baden-Württemberg and the Federal Republic of Germany. Dr. Hüssler was interested in both aspects of the Catholic Social Teaching. On the practical side, he distinguished himself in the excellent way he managed the affairs of Caritas in the whole world bringing relief and succor to thousands of people ravaged by war and natural disasters. On the theoretical level, he authored five insightful books among which are Caritas and Pastoral Work (1985), Life in the 20th Century (1998) and Humanity as Spirituality (2006). He has retired from active service and lives a quiet life in Freiburg

The saving Role of Relief Agencies in Biafra:TheJoint Church Aid (JCA)

It is pertinent to get a glimpse of the complex and dangerous circumstances in which the relief agencies operated. In fact, all the contentious elements in complex humanitarian emergencies interplayed in the Biafran war such as the possibility of exploiting existing differences within the civil society; the issue of disputed legitimacy of host authorities; high prevalence of hunger and disease; keen and probing journalistic interest; the likelihood of manipulating relief for military and diplomatic advantages and apparent division among the international relief agencies. While all these complex issues were being discussed in high and low quarters, the estimated monthly death-toll in Biafra was put at 750,000.

The first major huddle was the non-agreement of Biafran and Nigerian governments on the route through which relief aid should be supplied. While Nigeria wanted relief to pass through Lagos , Biafra on the other hand saw it as suicidal to let their food pass through enemy hands. When Obilagu Airstrip came as a compromise, the federal troops captured it within a few weeks and Uli was now the only outlet through which relief came to Biafra . The Nigerian government strongly opposed it and refused to guarantee safety of flights landing at Uli. The Red Cross was the first to airlift food in August 1968 but was compelled to stop after one of its planes was shot down by the Nigerian government killing the entire crew.

At this juncture, the JCA which was made up of 37 international Church bodies from 28countries picked up the gauntlet. It defied the federal governments order and began one of the most efficient and effective relief Airlifts in the history of humanitarian intervention. Fr. Hüssler told us that this was the first time relief agencies charted their own planes to supply relief materials. He recounted how he and Father Tony Byrne the Deputy Director of JCA with representatives from the Churches went to France to purchase four planes. According to Fr. Hussler, “initially, we hired one experienced Pilot, Frank Wharton (an American of Latvian descent) who was later joined by Gustav von Rosen another pilot from Sweden among others.” Von Rosen brought four of his own planes and flew relief aids into Biafra free of charge. However, as the Nigerian government was vehemently against this life-line, Uli Airstrip which was only 8,000 foot was bombarded day and night but after each bombardment, it was quickly repaired to received the next flights. In the end, JCA airlifted about 60,000 tons of assorted relief materials in 5,300 flights. The Red Cross, before its short-lived assistance, ferried 41,000 tons of food and medical equipment in 4,000 flights. There were also significant contributions by other smaller relief agencies. The entire relief action mounted by JCA gulped the sum of about $116 million dollars and another $250 million dollars was invested in it by American private interests. This wonderful work of mercy was accomplished but not without heavy human loses on the part of the helpers. Thus, by the end of 1969, 27 pilots had lost their lives with 10 planes short down by the Nigerian Air Force.

JCA’s assistance was not limited to sending food to Biafra ; it also came in some other significant ways. For example, when in January 1968, the Nigeria government changed its currency, Biafra became literally bankcrupt. Even though it printed its own currency, the purchasing power of the Biafran money worth little or nothing. The relief agencies exchanged the Biafran pounds at the rate of $2.80. In this regard, Fr. Hüssler made a handsome donation in cash even after the war had ended. According to him “unknown to me, on January 15, 1970, when I flew to Lagos to meet Gowon, the end of the Nigeria-Biafra war was announced that day. Now, the Biafrans were left with no money since the Biafran Currency had become worthless. I had 100,000 Deutsche Mark in my bag which I changed into Nigerian Currency, chartered a Taxi and drove down to Onitsha where the money was handed over the Church through the then Archbishop Arinze, who took it with two hands and expressed his gratitude.”

The relief planes did not lift relief materials alone. “We discovered that the planes were flying empty back to Europe, so we quickly loaded children and the sick into the planes and flew them to safety in Europe and some African countries such as Gabon , Sao- Tomé etc.” Fr. Hüssler personally took two children from Okporo in Orlu to Europe - Roseline and Moses. Roseline had a hole in her head while Moses had a broken jaw. Unfortunately, Roseline did not survive but Moses is still alive today. Dr. Hüssler related to us that one of the things that touched him during those turbulent days was the magnanimity shown to 3,000 Biafran children by late Oma Bongo of Gabon . He gave the JCA a very large expanse of land where an English school was built. Bongo personally gathered about 56 competent personnel from different countries to give the children sound education. Another 1,000 children were also airlifted to Sao-Tomé – a Portuguese Island perching on the Atlantic Ocean . Fr. Hüssler also told us that he was delighted by the way Gowon spontaneously gave permission for the children airlifted to Gabon to come back to Nigeria .

Conclusion

This was how we spent the two and half hours with him and his former secretary –Frau Engesser, when he was Caritas President . It was indeed a pleasant company. As Dr. Hüssler re-lived this intense experience, tears of joy rolled down his chicks and he ended by saying in German Language “also, das war doch eine schöne Arbeit und ich bin Gott dankbar” – that was indeed a nice work and I thank God for that. We were very glad that we met him in person. There are still a lot of other people out there who played decisive roles during those 30 months of horror and degradation. One such person is John Doyle – a Holy Ghost Father who is now over 80 years old and lives in Reutershügelweg4, D-18069, Rostock , Germany . It would be good for Umuigbo who live in this area to pay him a visit and, on behalf of all Biafrans in general and, Ndiigbo in particular, personally express our heart-felt gratitude to him. Finally, we wish Father Hüssler a happy Birth-day, more healthy days ahead and God’s choicest blessings.



(Rev. Fr. Dr. Tobe Nnamani, MSP, is a priest of the Missionaries of St. Paul. He studied in Germany and Belgium and now teaches at the National Missionary Seminary of St. Paul, Abuja . Contact:ecomat23@yahoo.co.uk, GSM: +234-80-36-37-88-03).